Across the globe, political movements have increasingly turned to youth as a key demographic to fuel their campaigns and, often, their divisions. From street protests to social media campaigns, young people are becoming more central in shaping political landscapes, particularly in countries grappling with deep economic disparities, social unrest, and institutional mistrust. In her 2020 book Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right, Cynthia Miller-Idriss delves into how far-right movements, particularly neonazism, are increasingly targeting youth to bolster their ranks.
While the political climate in Pakistan is a far cry from the explicit racism and violence that characterize far-right extremism in the West, there are disturbing parallels between Miller-Idriss’s observations on youth recruitment and the political strategies employed by Imran Khan, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister and leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Khan’s rise to power and his sustained political influence are not just a testament to his charismatic appeal but also an indictment of how political movements, when unchecked, can exploit youth discontent to deepen societal divides.
Miller-Idriss identifies key strategies that extremist movements use to attract young followers, often offering a potent mix of ideological clarity, a sense of victimhood, and an identity built around community. These movements frame their grievances as existential, portraying their youth as victims and defenders of a threatened way of life. Far from mere ideological zealots, these movements cleverly adapt their narratives to resonate with the specific grievances of the young, making the extreme seem ordinary, and the radical appear mainstream. In Pakistan, Imran Khan has harnessed similar tactics, tapping into youth’s anger, frustration, and disillusionment, albeit within a political framework that stops short of outright extremism.
At the heart of Khan’s appeal to youth is his framing of Pakistan’s entrenched economic problems as a form of betrayal by the ruling elite. With youth unemployment hovering around 10% and an increasing number of educated young people struggling to find jobs, Khan has positioned himself as the antidote to a corrupt system that perpetuates inequality. Much like far-right leaders who find traction among economically disenfranchised groups, Khan has skillfully used narratives of economic victimhood to mobilize youth.
In this respect, Khan’s rhetoric echoes the tactics identified by Miller-Idriss, wherein extremist groups link larger ideological struggles to their target audience’s tangible, immediate concerns. Khan’s supporters—especially from the lower-middle class and urban youth—perceive him as a champion who will break the stranglehold of entrenched political elites. The promise of economic justice and the rhetoric of “Naya Pakistan” (New Pakistan) have allowed Khan to tap into a pool of disillusioned youth who see the political establishment as a source of their woes rather than a solution.
One of the defining features of far-right movements globally is their use of a victimhood narrative, portraying the “in-group” (their supporters) as under siege, often by a shadowy or foreign force. Khan has adeptly woven this narrative into his political discourse, painting Pakistan’s traditional political parties as corrupt, inept, and complicit in a broader conspiracy against the nation. His accusations that Pakistan is the victim of foreign powers, notably the West, and domestic conspiracies, such as judicial or military interference, resonate with youth who feel that their country is under threat from both within and outside its borders.
This rhetoric aligns closely with the polarizing tactics used by extremist groups, who create a clear dichotomy between “us” (the virtuous, oppressed masses) and “them” (the corrupt elites, foreign agents, or outsiders). In Pakistan, Khan’s continuous vilification of rivals like the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) as enemies of the state mirrors the far-right’s tendency to portray political opponents as threats to national survival.
Miller-Idriss also discusses how far-right groups adeptly use pop culture and social media to spread their ideologies, ensuring their messages are engaging and relatable to younger audiences. Imran Khan’s PTI has followed a strikingly similar blueprint. The use of social media platforms—particularly Twitter, YouTube, and TikTok—has been central to Khan’s strategy, allowing him to bypass traditional media channels often seen as corrupt or biased. His movement’s online presence is highly curated, using memes, videos, and viral hashtags to generate excitement and build a sense of community among young supporters.
Just as far-right groups have embraced online spaces to spread their messages, Khan has made social media a central tool in his political outreach. His supporters flood digital spaces with content that portrays him as the hero and his critics as traitors. This digital mobilization creates an echo chamber that reinforces the “us vs. them” narrative, turning online discourse into an arena of constant battle where only Khan’s version of reality is seen as the truth.
Khan’s youth-centric political strategy is undoubtedly one of his most powerful assets. By energizing young people through rallies, protests, and social media campaigns, he has turned PTI into a movement that thrives on the passion and activism of youth. Mass mobilization in the form of street protests and sit-ins—often spearheaded by young people—has become a hallmark of Khan’s political brand. While initially framed as legitimate expressions of dissent, these protests have often spilt over into violent confrontations and gridlocked politics, eroding the ability of state institutions to function effectively. However, critics argue that Khan’s approach has mobilised and radicalised youth, contributing to a broader culture of mistrust, instability, and political polarization. His focus on institutional mistrust, personal charisma, and a divisive rhetoric of confrontation has undermined the already fragile democratic processes in Pakistan. The idea of consensus, of building bridges across political divides, has been replaced by a focus on showing the strength of the “masses” against the “elites,” a strategy that, while empowering youth, is also pushing the country further into a political crisis.
The similarities between the tactics used by Imran Khan and those of far-right movements globally are striking. Both rely on emotional appeals, victimhood narratives, and the power of social media to recruit, rally, and radicalize youth. While Khan’s politics may not be extremist in the traditional sense, his methods share many commonalities with the far-right’s approach to political mobilization. The long-term effect of such strategies is concerning, as they risk entrenching division, undermining institutions, and hindering the democratic processes necessary for Pakistan’s progress.
As Pakistan’s political landscape becomes more polarized, the question remains whether the youth mobilized by Khan’s rhetoric will be able to shift away from destructive partisanship and into a more constructive and inclusive vision for the country. The challenges ahead are formidable, but the cost of continued polarization could be disastrous for Pakistan’s democratic future.
Manahil Jaffer is an international relations graduate from National defence university, Islamabad. She can be reached at manahil.jaffer786@gmail.com
