How Assad’s fall has damaged Russia’s ambitions in Africa

Russia has withdrawn the majority of its forces from Syria, weeks after the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

Vladimir Putin’s troops have vacated key positions, including the Qamishli base in northern Syria, Ukraine’s main military intelligence directorate has said.

Russia still maintains a presence in coastal Syria at Khmeimim air base and the port of Tartus, but reports indicate it is preparing to either significantly draw down or withdraw fully.

The withdrawal highlights Moscow’s shifting priorities, raising questions about its ability to maintain influence in the region amid ongoing instability. But it also raises doubts about Russia’s ability to project its power into Africa.

Control of the two main bases in Syria is vital for Kremlin missions to funnel aid, military kit and mercenaries to Africa, the core of Putin’s personal neo-colonialism project.

He has deliberately fanned coups in west Africa, and dazzled its leaders with offers of cheap energy, grain, spy satellites and security as part of his global fight against the US and its allies.

The Council on Foreign Relations, a US-based think tank, says of the Kremlin’s Africa project:  “Russia’s overarching goal is to gain more support for its vision of a multi-polar world order based on weakened Western influence.”

Analysts say Putin decided that the West was vulnerable in former European colonies in West Africa – specifically Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and the Central African Republic.

And so he targeted them.

In Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, coups encouraged by Russia since 2021 have installed pro-Kremlin military juntas who have become regular guests to Moscow. Meanwhile, France and the US have been forced to dismantle military bases in the region.

In return for backing these coups and the resulting military governments, Putin expects pro-Russia policies that include supporting its policies at the UN, blaming Ukraine and the US for “global terrorism”, and handing over the rights to valuable minerals and mines.

But, there was one major obstacle to Putin’s plan to undermine the West through Africa. Supply lines.

The route from Russia to west Africa is a long one, too long for heavily laden Russian cargo aircraft.

And this was where Russia’s Khmeimim air base and Tartus naval base in Syria came in. They became vital cogs for the Kremlin’s resupply routes for west Africa.

“Control over naval and air bases in Syria is vital for Russian interests throughout Africa,” said the US-based Atlantic Council think tank this week.

Russian cargo planes could land at Khmeimim to refuel halfway to Libya, where Russia has also built a foothold by supporting rebels based in Benghazi, or roughly a third of the way through flights to west Africa.

The Tartus base became Russia’s main “replenishment and repair” base in the Mediterranean Sea, giving the Russian navy a safe harbour and hub to project power and influence towards north Africa.

The problem for the Kremlin now is that it doesn’t have a deal with Syria’s new Islamist government, which captured Damascus earlier this month, to allow it to keep control of these two bases.

Samuel Ramani, an associate fellow at the RUSI think tank and the author of the book Russia in Africa, described the collapse of Assad’s regime as a “geopolitical and status defeat for Russia” that not only creates logistical problems but undermines its reputation with pro-Kremlin dictators in Africa.

“The Syrian model of counter-insurgency based on authoritarian stability was Russia’s main offering to autocracies in crisis in Africa,” he said.

Even Kremlin insiders have started to concede that the collapse of the Assad regime in 11 days means that Russia needs to rein in its global ambitions, and perhaps accept its role as a regional power.

“The collapse of the former Syria is bad news for Russia since its military presence there significantly expanded Moscow’s space of action in both the Middle East and Africa,” wrote Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian foreign affairs analyst.

Last week, Russian forces in Syria were videoed pulling back from smaller forward operating bases to Khmeimim and Tartus. Rebels have been told not to attack Russian forces, but the Kremlin has said that it has not yet secured a hard deal to keep the bases.

And, as John Foreman, a former Royal Navy officer who previously served as British military attache to Russia, explains, there are not many decent alternatives to these two bases as resupply and power-project points for the Kremlin.

“Libyan air bases are a poor substitute for Khmeimim in terms of facilities, runways, location, and security,” he said.

Russia has some leverage in east Libya, but it is reliant on getting permission from its allies there to use their harbours and air bases.

This week US officials said that the Kremlin was in talks to upgrade port facilities in Libya. It has also flown out air defence systems from its bases in Syria to Libya.

In Sudan, Russia is effectively sponsoring both sides in a civil war and is still trying to negotiate access to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

Both options are far more complicated, expensive and fragile than shifting kit and men through the Syrian bases.

Which brings us back to west Africa.

Fall in Russian activity predicted

In Bamako, Mali’s capital, Ulf Laessing, director of the Sahel programme at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a German think tank, said that he anticipated a drop-off in Kremlin activity in the region because of the logistical problems created by the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria.

“It’s fair to say that Russia won’t be able to expand any further, like Chad which they probably had in their sights,” he said. “I am also not sure they will be able to keep their current operations in Mali, Niger, Central African Republic or Burkina Faso at the same level.”

Essentially, the unravelling of Putin’s pet project in Syria, less than 10 years after his much-heralded intervention there, threatens to undermine his operations in Africa too.

This week, Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign affairs commissioner, said she was determined to convince Syria’s new government to close Russia’s bases to cut the Kremlin’s influence in Africa.

Syria was always the Achilles heel of the Kremlin’s African project.

And Putin’s enemies know this.

EMEA Tribune is not involved in this news article, it is taken from our partners and or from the News Agencies. Copyright and Credit go to the News Agencies, email news@emeatribune.com Follow our WhatsApp verified Channel